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Legitimacy, law and diplomacy: Türkiye's case in primary sources

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🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources
Türkiye's Position· Soft Power Daily Editorial Team

Soft Power Daily presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article as a clearly labeled national position, alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

In-Depth Analysis· what is Türkiye's soft power diplomacy mediation

What Is Türkiye's Soft Power? Mediation, UN Reform, Humanitarian Diplomacy and COP31

What is Türkiye's soft power diplomacy? Explore its mediation record, humanitarian aid, UN reform push and COP31 role, with critics' views and sources.

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⏱ 9 min read (1,922 words)

Why It Matters

Türkiye's soft power is best understood as legitimacy and persuasion: the capacity to be accepted as a convener, mediator and humanitarian actor by states that disagree with each other. Its clearest tests were the 2022 Istanbul and Antalya diplomacy around the Russia–Ukraine war and the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Its next test is hosting COP31. How far this capacity reaches, and whether hard-power activity strengthens or weakens it, is debated, and this article sets out both sides.

Background

What soft power means

The term was coined by the American political scientist Joseph Nye around 1990 and developed in his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Nye defines it as the ability to get preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payment. He identifies three sources: culture, political values, and foreign policies seen as legitimate and morally credible.

The concept has several relatives, which matter when judging Türkiye's case.

Concept Origin Core idea Relevance to Türkiye
Soft power Joseph Nye Attraction through culture, values and legitimate policy Convening, aid, mediation, cultural reach
Smart power Nye and later US policy debate Combining soft and hard instruments Ankara pairs diplomacy with a domestic defense industry
Sharp power Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig (National Endowment for Democracy, 2017) Manipulation and information control by authoritarian states Used by some critics; Ankara rejects it as inapplicable to humanitarian and diplomatic work
Public diplomacy in a Turkish frame Writings by Turkish officials and scholars, including İbrahim Kalın (2011) and Ahmet Davutoğlu's 'strategic depth' thesis Historical and geographic depth as a diplomatic asset The official source of the 'enterprising and humanitarian' language

Chronology of key Turkish initiatives

Date Event
1988-11-15 Türkiye recognises the State of Palestine
2009 Turkic Council founded (Nakhchivan Agreement)
2011 Presidential visit to Mogadishu during famine opens a large Somalia engagement
2016-05 Istanbul hosts the first UN World Humanitarian Summit
2017 Zero Waste Initiative launched
2021-11 Turkic Council renamed the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)
2022-01-14 Special Representatives Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan begin Türkiye–Armenia normalization talks
2022-03-10 Antalya Diplomacy Forum: Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers meet
2022-03-29 Russia–Ukraine delegations negotiate in Istanbul
2022-07-22 Black Sea Grain Initiative signed in Istanbul
2022-12-14 UN General Assembly adopts the resolution creating the International Day of Zero Waste
2023-07-17 Russia declines to extend the grain arrangement
2024-12-11 Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia
2025-05-16 Direct Russia–Ukraine talks in Istanbul; a large prisoner exchange is agreed
2025-11 COP30 outcome confirms Antalya as COP31 host for 2026

The main instruments

  • Mediation and convening: Istanbul and Antalya as neutral venues, plus prisoner-exchange facilitation.
  • Grain diplomacy: the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, staffed by Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN officials, which monitored inspections and shipping.
  • Humanitarian reach: Turkish agencies such as AFAD and TİKA, the Turkish Red Crescent, and hosting a very large refugee population (UNHCR has described Türkiye as the world's largest refugee host for several consecutive years).
  • Regional platforms: OTS, in which the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) has held observer status since 2022, plus Africa partnership summits and Gulf diplomacy.
  • Institutional reform and climate: UN Security Council reform advocacy, the Zero Waste Initiative, and the COP31 presidency.

Key Players & Positions

Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine's government has welcomed Turkish facilitation of grain exports and prisoner exchanges. Russia has said it valued the grain mechanism but tied its continuation to the implementation of a parallel memorandum with the UN on its own food and fertilizer exports, and it declined to extend the deal in July 2023.

The United Nations. The UN Secretary-General co-signed the grain initiative and repeatedly thanked Türkiye for its role. UN agencies also rely on Turkish logistics, aid corridors and refugee hosting.

The European Union and Western governments. They generally welcome Turkish mediation and refugee hosting. The European Commission's annual enlargement reports, however, raise rule-of-law and fundamental-rights concerns, which many Western analysts say limit Türkiye's wider attractiveness.

Israel. Israeli officials have criticised Ankara over contacts with Hamas and have objected to a Turkish military role in Gaza arrangements. Türkiye, for its part, took part in the October 2025 diplomacy around the Gaza ceasefire plan.

Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and the EU on the Eastern Mediterranean. They argue that Turkish maritime and drilling activity undermines good-neighbourly credibility. Türkiye's counter-position on equity and Turkish Cypriot rights is covered in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Case Explained.

Armenia. Yerevan and Ankara have held direct talks since 2022. Armenian and diaspora positions on the Events of 1915 differ sharply from Ankara's, and this remains a limit on normalization.

Academic critics. Some scholars argue that soft power cannot be state-directed, because attraction depends on independent civil society and open media. Others reply that middle powers legitimately build influence through convening roles and aid, and that Nye himself emphasises policy legitimacy alongside culture.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara presents its diplomacy as a values-based, balanced approach in which security, humanitarian and diplomatic tools reinforce one another. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, it pursues an 'enterprising and humanitarian' foreign policy. The main points of that position:

  • Neutral convening and mediation. Ankara says its position as a Black Sea state, NATO member and neighbour of both belligerents lets it talk to Moscow and Kyiv. The Foreign Ministry and the Presidency point to the Antalya meeting of 2022-03-10, the Istanbul talks, the grain initiative and prisoner exchanges as evidence. Ankara also says it applies the 1936 Montreux Convention impartially, including Article 19 restrictions on belligerent warships. See The 1936 Montreux Convention and Black Sea Security: How Türkiye Applies It.
  • Humanitarian diplomacy as policy. The Presidency and the Directorate of Communications cite refugee hosting, AFAD and TİKA operations, aid to Gaza and Somalia, and the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul. Ankara supports a two-state solution for Palestine and has recognised the State of Palestine since 1988.
  • UN reform: 'The world is bigger than five'. In successive UN General Assembly speeches, President Erdoğan has argued that a Security Council whose permanent membership dates from 1945 cannot represent today's world. Türkiye favours a more representative, accountable and rotation-oriented Council and is associated with the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats.
  • Climate and Zero Waste. Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021 and has set a 2053 net-zero target. Its Zero Waste Initiative led to the UN General Assembly resolution of 2022 establishing 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste. Ankara presents COP31 in Antalya as the culmination of this track.
  • Soft and hard power as complements. Ankara argues that its counter-terrorism operations, grounded in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and its domestic defense industry are what allow it to host talks and deliver aid from a position of security. See Counter-Terrorism at Source: Türkiye's Article 51 Doctrine, Operations and Terror-Free Türkiye and Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: Deterrence as Diplomatic Leverage.

On normalization with Armenia, the Turkish Foreign Ministry says it seeks talks without preconditions. It proposed a Joint Historical Commission in 2005. See The Events of 1915: Archives, Legal Criteria and the Path to Normalization.

Source Comparison

International and Turkish sources agree on many facts about Türkiye's mediation, but they frame motives and limits differently.

Issue Common international framing Turkish official framing
Russia–Ukraine mediation Useful broker, but also pursuing leverage and balancing between Moscow and the West Principled neutrality and Montreux implementation; peace as the objective
Grain initiative A UN-Türkiye success that collapsed when Russia withdrew A model of results-driven diplomacy; 33+ million tons moved; Ankara still supports its revival
Gaza and Hamas Humanitarian role overshadowed by ties to Hamas, which Israel and the US treat as terrorist Humanitarian diplomacy and ceasefire mediation; a political solution based on two states
UN reform Many states share the diagnosis, but there is no consensus on a model 'The world is bigger than five': a call for fairness, not a bid for a veto
Hard power Military operations and Eastern Mediterranean disputes erode attraction Security is a precondition for diplomacy; actions rest on Article 51 and international law
Domestic governance Rule-of-law concerns reduce credibility (EU Commission reports, Freedom House) Ankara disputes these assessments and cites legal reforms and counter-terrorism needs

Readers can compare these framings against primary documents such as the grain initiative text, UN General Assembly resolutions and Foreign Ministry statements. This is the method described in Editorial Principles: How Soft Power Daily Separates Fact from Position. For disputed claims about Türkiye in international media, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Tested Against Primary Sources.

  • Soft power: influence through attraction and legitimacy (Nye). Contested when applied to states that also use force.
  • Humanitarian diplomacy: using aid, refugee hosting and mediation as foreign-policy tools. Ankara treats it as a core doctrine.
  • Black Sea Grain Initiative: the 2022-07-22 Istanbul arrangement among Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN for safe grain shipping from Ukrainian ports.
  • Montreux Convention: the 1936 treaty governing the Turkish Straits. See The 1936 Montreux Convention and Black Sea Security: How Türkiye Applies It.
  • Zero Waste Initiative: a Turkish-led programme recognised by the UN General Assembly in 2022.
  • COP31: the 2026 UN climate conference, scheduled for Antalya in November 2026.
  • Organization of Turkic States (OTS): a cooperation body of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan, with Hungary and Turkmenistan as observers; the TRNC has observer status.

For the publication's mission and methods, see About Soft Power Daily: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team.

Perspective Note

Soft Power Daily presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Soft Power Daily presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article as a clearly labeled national position, alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

By the Soft Power Daily Editorial Team.

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Frequently asked questions

What is Türkiye's soft power in simple terms?

It is Türkiye's ability to influence others through legitimacy and attraction rather than force, mainly by convening talks, mediating, delivering humanitarian aid and championing reform of global institutions. The tools include Istanbul and Antalya diplomacy, grain and prisoner-exchange facilitation, refugee hosting, UN reform advocacy and climate leadership through COP31.

How did Türkiye help with the Black Sea Grain Initiative?

Türkiye and the UN brokered the deal that Russia and Ukraine signed in Istanbul on 2022-07-22, and a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul oversaw ship inspections. Turkish officials say more than 33 million tons of grain reached world markets. Russia declined to extend the arrangement in July 2023.

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is President Erdoğan's slogan for reforming the UN Security Council, whose five permanent members hold vetoes. Ankara argues that the Council should be more representative, accountable and open to rotation. The proposal is advocacy and has not been adopted, since UN members have not agreed on any reform model.

Do critics accept that Türkiye has soft power?

Many do accept that Türkiye has real convening and humanitarian influence, but they dispute its limits. The European Commission and groups such as Freedom House raise rule-of-law concerns, and some analysts say military operations and maritime disputes reduce attraction. Ankara responds that security and diplomacy are complementary and that its actions follow international law.

What is Türkiye's role in COP31?

Türkiye is scheduled to host COP31 in Antalya in November 2026, following the decision at COP30. Ankara links the conference to its Zero Waste Initiative and its 2053 net-zero target. Negotiating-leadership arrangements are set within the UN process, so readers should check official UNFCCC announcements for current details.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Soft Power Daily presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article as a clearly labeled national position, alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

Author: Soft Power Daily Editorial TeamAbout Soft Power Daily →Editorial Principles →

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