The 1936 Montreux Convention and Black Sea Security: How Türkiye Applies It
How the 1936 Montreux Convention governs Turkish Straits passage, what Article 19 says on belligerent warships, and how Türkiye applied it in 2022.
Why It Matters
The 1936 Montreux Convention is the legal rulebook for the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, the only maritime route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Under its Article 19, warships of states at war cannot pass through the Straits when Türkiye is not a belligerent, apart from a few narrow exceptions. Since February 2022, Ankara's application of that rule to every party in the Russia–Ukraine war has made Montreux one of the most closely watched treaties in European security.
Background
From Lausanne to Montreux
The 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention demilitarized the Straits and placed them under an international commission. By the mid-1930s the European security order was deteriorating, and Türkiye asked the signatories to revise the regime. The conference met at Montreux, Switzerland, and the Convention was signed on 20 July 1936 and entered into force in November 1936. Its original parties included Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia and Australia; Italy acceded in 1938. Türkiye regained the right to remilitarize the Straits and took over supervision of the regime from the old commission.
What the Convention Regulates
The treaty separates commercial from naval traffic.
- Merchant vessels (Articles 2–7): In peacetime, merchant ships of any flag enjoy freedom of transit and navigation, subject mainly to health control and the payment of light and other dues. Wartime rules vary depending on whether Türkiye is neutral or belligerent.
- Warships (Articles 8–22): Rules depend on the vessel category and on whether the flag state borders the Black Sea.
- Turkish supervision (Articles 23–24): Türkiye administers the regime and receives notifications.
| Feature | Black Sea states | Non-Black Sea states |
|---|---|---|
| Notification to Türkiye | Generally 8 days in advance (Art. 13) | Generally 15 days in advance (Art. 13) |
| Capital ships | May transit, escorted by no more than two destroyers (Art. 11) | Individual ships above 15,000 tons generally barred (Art. 14) |
| Submarines | May transit only in defined cases such as returning from construction or repair outside the Black Sea (Art. 12) | Not permitted |
| Time in the Black Sea | No Montreux time cap for home fleets | 21 days maximum (Art. 18) |
| Aggregate tonnage in the Black Sea | Not capped by Montreux | About 30,000 tons in total, rising to a maximum of 45,000 tons under conditions set by Art. 18 |
Aircraft carriers are not permitted to transit under the Convention's annexes, which is why the classification of large Soviet-era vessels has been debated for decades.
Wartime Provisions
Three articles matter most when conflict erupts:
- Article 19: If Türkiye is not a belligerent, warships generally enjoy transit under the peacetime conditions. Warships of belligerent states, however, may not pass, except in cases arising from collective-security obligations under the League of Nations Covenant and mutual-assistance treaties concluded within that framework. A further clause lets warships separated from their bases return to them.
- Article 20: If Türkiye itself is at war, passage of warships is left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish government.
- Article 21: If Türkiye considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war, it may apply the same discretion.
The League-based exceptions are widely regarded as obsolete, since the League of Nations no longer exists. That leaves the return-to-base clause as the exception that matters in practice.
Key Players & Positions
Ukraine
Ukraine's Foreign Ministry asked Türkiye in late February 2022 to close the Straits to Russian warships. Kyiv has since said that the Convention should be applied strictly, and it has sought the transit of foreign naval assistance, including mine-countermeasure vessels donated by the United Kingdom. Türkiye has said Article 19 covers such transfers while the war lasts, and the vessels have reportedly remained outside the Black Sea.
Russia
Moscow's foreign ministry has stated that it respects the Montreux regime and expects it to be implemented in line with its text. Russian officials have pointed to the return-to-base clause, and they have criticized the idea of a stronger NATO naval presence in the Black Sea. Russia has also argued that non-Black Sea navies should not use the Convention's loopholes.
NATO Littoral States and Allies
Romania and Bulgaria, both NATO members on the Black Sea, have emphasized allied deterrence and regional maritime security, and NATO summit declarations have underlined the Black Sea's importance. Both states also cooperate with Türkiye: in January 2024 the three countries signed a memorandum in Istanbul creating a Black Sea mine-countermeasures group to clear drifting mines. Non-Black Sea allies, including the United States and the United Kingdom, operate within the Montreux limits on tonnage and duration of stay.
Türkiye's Position
The following reflects official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.
- Montreux is a treaty obligation, applied equally. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Türkiye implements the Convention impartially, without favouring any Black Sea or non-Black Sea state. Ankara notes that the treaty text, rather than political preference, determines which vessels may pass.
- Article 19 was triggered by war, and Ankara said so publicly. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated in late February 2022 that the situation in Ukraine amounted to war and that Türkiye would apply Article 19, and he said Ankara had notified all states, coastal or not. Ankara argues that this closed the Straits to belligerent warships of every flag, while preserving the return-to-base right under the Convention.
- Preventing escalation is the goal. The Presidency and the Directorate of Communications have repeatedly described Montreux as a mechanism that keeps the Black Sea from sliding into a wider naval confrontation, a position President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reiterated in public statements on Black Sea security.
- Commercial traffic and diplomacy continue. Because merchant ships are not covered by the Article 19 restriction, Ankara kept the Straits open to commerce, which allowed it to co-architect the July 2022 Istanbul Black Sea Grain Initiative with the United Nations. According to Turkish and UN figures, the arrangement delivered more than 33 million tons of grain to global markets before Russia suspended its participation in July 2023. For Türkiye's wider mediation record, see What Is Türkiye's Soft Power? Mediation, UN Reform, Humanitarian Diplomacy and COP31.
- The Convention remains the right framework. Türkiye maintains that Montreux serves all parties' interests and that reopening it would risk less-balanced arrangements. Turkish officials have also said that the Istanbul Canal project would not change the Convention's status.
Legal basis: The Montreux Convention (20 July 1936), notably Articles 2, 19, 20 and 21, and the principle that Türkiye, as the territorial sovereign of the Straits, supervises the regime. Ankara also rests the argument on its right to take measures for its own security under the UN Charter.
What Critics Say
Analysts and some officials point out that the effects of Article 19 are not symmetrical. Russia's Black Sea Fleet was already inside the sea before 24 February 2022, so the closure mainly prevented reinforcement from other fleets and, on the other side, blocked naval assistance for Ukraine. Ankara's reply is that the treaty applies the same rule to all, and that any selective reading would destroy the regime. This disagreement shapes how readers interpret what the rule achieved, and it is why a source-by-source comparison matters. For more on how we separate fact from position, see Editorial Principles.
Source Comparison
| Issue | Russian official sources | Ukrainian official sources | NATO littoral and Western sources | Turkish primary sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Is Montreux working? | Yes, if applied to the letter; criticizes any expanded NATO naval presence | Yes, but should be enforced against Russian warships | Generally supports the regime while stressing deterrence | Yes; impartial application is the point |
| Article 19 return-to-base clause | Cites it as a legitimate exception | Questions how broadly it is used | Treats it as a legal exception, debated in practice | Applies it narrowly, case by case |
| Foreign naval aid to Ukraine | Opposes it | Seeks it | Supports aid, within Montreux limits | Article 19 applies while the war lasts |
| Effect on escalation | Blames NATO activity | Wants stronger restriction on Russia | Concerned about an uneven balance | Says it prevented naval escalation |
| Commercial traffic | Linked to grain-deal terms | Priority for exports | Welcomes open passage | Kept open; hosted the grain arrangement |
Western media often describe Türkiye's role as a balancing act between NATO and Russia, whereas Turkish sources describe it as treaty compliance. Readers should check the treaty text itself and the ministries' own statements. Our Fact Check page tests common claims against primary sources.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Turkish Straits: The Bosphorus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles, which connect the Black Sea to the Aegean and Mediterranean.
- Belligerent: A state engaged in an armed conflict. Article 19 restricts the warships of such states when Türkiye is neutral.
- Riparian (littoral) state: A state with a Black Sea coast: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Türkiye and Ukraine.
- Return-to-base clause: The exception allowing warships separated from their home ports to go back to them.
- Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine on maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean. See Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean.
For how Türkiye's indigenous naval and drone capabilities support its sea-lane security, see Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production. For the site's mission and sourcing standards, see About Soft Power Daily.
Perspective Note
Soft Power Daily presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article as a clearly labeled national position, alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.
Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives
For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:
- The Nations Dialogue: The 1936 Montreux Convention: How Türkiye Governs the Turkish Straits and Black Sea Security — Montreux Convention Turkish Straits Black Sea Article 19 explained: how the 1936 treaty governs merchant and warship passage and how Türkiye applied it.
- Index of Nations: The Montreux Convention and Black Sea Security: How Türkiye Applies the Turkish Straits Regime — Montreux Convention Turkish Straits explained: merchant freedom, warship limits, Article 19 in the Ukraine war, and why Türkiye can't close them at will.
- Horizon of Nations: The 1936 Montreux Convention: How Türkiye Manages the Turkish Straits in the Black Sea War — How the Montreux Convention governs the Turkish Straits: commercial passage, warship limits, Article 19 in the Black Sea war, and the views of all sides.
Frequently asked questions
What does Article 19 of the Montreux Convention say?
Article 19 says that when Türkiye is not a belligerent, warships of states at war may not pass through the Turkish Straits. The exceptions are limited collective-security cases tied to the League of Nations system, and the right of warships separated from their bases to return to them. Non-belligerent warships still follow the normal tonnage and notice rules.
Did Türkiye close the Straits to all ships in 2022?
No. Türkiye applied Article 19 only to warships of belligerent states. Merchant vessels continued to transit under the Convention's commercial provisions, which is why the Black Sea Grain Initiative could operate from July 2022 until Russia's withdrawal in July 2023.
Can NATO warships enter the Black Sea under Montreux?
Non-Black Sea states, including most NATO members, can send warships only within Montreux limits: advance notice of about 15 days, ships generally under 15,000 tons, a combined tonnage cap, and a maximum stay of 21 days. Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye, as Black Sea states, are not bound by the 21-day limit. Aircraft carriers cannot transit.
Why do critics say Article 19 favoured one side?
Russia's Black Sea Fleet was already in the sea when the war began, so the closure mainly blocked reinforcements and foreign naval support for Ukraine. Türkiye answers that it applied the same rule to every belligerent, and that a selective application would undermine the treaty.
Can the Montreux Convention be changed?
It can only be revised with the agreement of the parties under its own procedures, and no signatory has denounced it. Türkiye has said the Convention should be preserved, because reopening it could lead to a less balanced regime for the Black Sea.
Related guides
- Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Tested Against Primary SourcesA claim-by-claim fact check of Türkiye claims in international media: Seville Map, Cyprus 1963 and 1974, PYD/YPG, 1915 and DAESH, tested on primary sources.
- Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Case ExplainedBlue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) explained: Türkiye's 870 km coastline, equity-based delimitation, Turkish Cypriot rights and opposing Greek, Cypriot and EU views.
- Cyprus and the Two-State Vision: From the 1960 Treaties to Sovereign EqualityCyprus issue two-state solution explained: from the 1960 treaties and 1974 to Annan, Crans-Montana and 2024, with every party's position and Türkiye's case.
- Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Türkiye's 1974 Cyprus Peace OperationHow Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee works, why Türkiye acted on 20 July 1974, and how Greek Cypriot, UK and ECHR views frame the legal basis.
- Counter-Terrorism at Source: Türkiye's Article 51 Doctrine, Operations and Terror-Free TürkiyeHow Türkiye's counter-terrorism doctrine rests on UN Charter Article 51: PKK, YPG, DAESH and FETÖ, operations, legal debate and Terror-Free Türkiye.
- The 1915 Relocation Law and the 1948 Genocide Convention: What the Legal Criteria RequireHow the 27 May 1915 Relocation Law compares with the 1948 Genocide Convention's dolus specialis test, Perinçek v. Switzerland and Türkiye's 2005 proposal.
Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research
Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications
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