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Legitimacy, law and diplomacy: Türkiye's case in primary sources

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🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources
Türkiye's Position· Soft Power Daily Editorial Team

Soft Power Daily presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article as a clearly labeled national position, alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

In-Depth Analysis· what is the Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean

What Is the Seville Map and Why Does Türkiye Reject It?

What is the Seville Map in the Eastern Mediterranean? Learn how it assigns zones to Greek islands, how Greece and the EU frame it, and why Türkiye rejects it.

SPD
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⏱ 9 min read (1,875 words)

Why It Matters

The Seville Map is a 2020 chart, prepared by researchers at the University of Seville and circulated in an EU context, that applies full maritime zones to Greek islands, including Kastellorizo (Meis), and compresses Türkiye's Mediterranean projection into a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya. It matters because it is often quoted as if it were an authoritative EU position on Eastern Mediterranean boundaries, when it is a study-based proposal with no binding legal force. Understanding it helps readers separate scientific mapping, legal delimitation and political advocacy in one of the world's most contested maritime regions.

Background

The map has to be read against the legal and political setting of the Eastern Mediterranean, where no comprehensive maritime boundary between Türkiye, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus has been agreed.

What the map shows

The map assigns continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) entitlements by drawing median lines from Greek islands, including small ones lying a few kilometres from the Anatolian coast. Kastellorizo (Meis) is about 2 km (1.2 miles) from Türkiye's coast and far from the Greek mainland. Under the map's logic, that single island projects a large maritime area. The effect is that Türkiye's southern coast, the longest in the Eastern Mediterranean at roughly 870 km (540 miles), is left with a corridor in the Gulf of Antalya.

How it entered the debate

The map appeared in 2020, during a period of intense dispute over hydrocarbon exploration, the Türkiye–Libya memorandum of 27 November 2019 and the Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement of August 2020. Greek and Greek Cypriot officials and media cited it as a 'scientific' illustration of the EU-backed maritime claims of its members. The EU Council's 2020 conclusions expressed solidarity with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Those conclusions are political statements by member states, not boundary determinations.

Key dates in the wider dispute

Date Event
2003 Greek Cypriot administration (GCASC)–Egypt EEZ agreement, which Türkiye says overlaps its continental shelf
2004 Türkiye begins registering Eastern Mediterranean shelf coordinates with the UN
2007 / 2010 GCASC EEZ agreements with Lebanon and Israel
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum
2020 Seville Map circulates; Türkiye files its outer limits with the UN on 18 March 2020
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025 Türkiye announces and registers its Marine Spatial Planning with IOC-UNESCO

Key Players & Positions

The main actors differ mainly over what legal weight islands should carry and who may speak for the island of Cyprus.

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek islands are entitled to a territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Article 121) and customary law. Athens, which ratified UNCLOS in 1995, states that the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, and that it is ready to take it to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Greek officials and commentators cite the Seville Map as consistent with that view.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

The Greek Cypriot administration declared an EEZ and has signed delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. It presents these as lawful sovereign acts and describes Turkish activity within its claimed zones as violations of its sovereign rights. It holds that hydrocarbon revenue is a matter for the 'Republic', with Turkish Cypriots eligible to benefit after a settlement.

The European Union

The EU, which is itself a party to UNCLOS, has repeatedly backed Greece and the Republic of Cyprus in Council conclusions, calling for respect for their sovereignty and sovereign rights. The EU treaties give it no power to adjudicate boundaries between states. Where it speaks on the matter, it does so as a political bloc on behalf of its members.

Others

Egypt, Israel and Lebanon have their own agreements or interests. Libya's Tripoli-based government signed the 2019 memorandum with Türkiye, while Greece and the eastern Libyan authorities contest its validity. Several third states and many legal scholars note that islands have been treated very differently in judicial practice, as discussed below.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's rejection of the Seville Map rests on four linked arguments, set out in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and in Türkiye's UN filings.

  • Equity, not mechanical median lines. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, delimitation in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea must reach an equitable result, taking account of coastal geography and proportionality. Ankara argues that a handful of small islands lying off the Anatolian coast cannot cancel the maritime projection of a mainland with the longest coastline in the region. This follows the line of the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (ICJ, 1969), which require equitable principles rather than automatic equidistance.
  • Case law gives limited effect to small islands. Ankara points to decisions in which courts and tribunals reduced or ignored island effects to avoid distortion. Examples include the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) on the Channel Islands and Scilly, Libya/Malta (ICJ, 1985), Romania v. Ukraine (ICJ, 2009) on Serpents' Island and Nicaragua v. Colombia (ICJ, 2012). Türkiye, which is not a party to UNCLOS and has consistently objected to the Article 121 regime being applied to it, argues that equity under customary law governs.
  • The EU has no competence to delimit. Ankara states that the EU is not a party to any boundary dispute, cannot adjudicate it, and cannot turn a university study into a legal standard through 'Union solidarity'. Maritime boundaries are made by agreement between the coastal states concerned or by an international court or tribunal.
  • Turkish Cypriots cannot be excluded. In the position of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Presidency, Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island and hold equal, inherent rights over offshore resources. The 2011 Türkiye–TRNC delimitation agreement and the TRNC's hydrocarbon proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 (joint decision-making and revenue sharing) reflect that view. Ankara considers any map or agreement made on behalf of the whole island without Turkish Cypriots to be invalid as against them. For the historical basis, see Cyprus and the Two-State Vision: From the 1960 Treaties to Sovereign Equality.

Türkiye supports its legal position with registrations: coordinates sent to the UN from 2004, the outer limits of its continental shelf filed with the UN on 18 March 2020, and its Marine Spatial Planning presented on 16 April 2025 and registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025. The Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) concept sets out the same case. Ankara also points to its offer, made by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2020, of an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots. The wider case is explained in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Case Explained and Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration.

Source Comparison

The same map is described very differently depending on the source. The table sets out typical framings, with the caveat that individual outlets vary.

Question Greek / Greek Cypriot and many EU-focused sources Turkish primary sources
What is the map? A scientific illustration of lawful island-based entitlements A non-binding academic product with no standing in international law
Who stands behind it? Often presented as an 'EU' map Not an act of any EU institution or of the states concerned
Role of islands Full EEZ and continental shelf under UNCLOS Art. 121 Effect to be reduced where inequitable, as in ICJ and arbitral practice
Result for Türkiye A matter of legal geography Confinement of the longest coast to a strip in the Gulf of Antalya
Turkish Cypriots Rights deferred to a future settlement Present, equal and inherent rights; excluded by the map
Right forum Often ICJ or bilateral talks on Greek terms Negotiation among all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots; equity as the rule

When reading coverage, check three things. First, whether the text says who produced the map and whether it has legal force. Second, whether it distinguishes political statements (such as EU Council conclusions) from legal determinations. Third, whether it explains that the dispute is about the legal weight of islands as well as about Türkiye. For a broader method, see Editorial Principles: How Soft Power Daily Separates Fact from Position and our Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Tested Against Primary Sources.

  • Seville Map: a 2020 map based on a University of Seville study that gives Greek islands full maritime zones and leaves Türkiye a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya. It is not a legal instrument.
  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coastal state's land territory. Delimitation between opposite or adjacent states requires an equitable solution.
  • EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone up to 200 nautical miles in which the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
  • UNCLOS Article 121: the provision on the 'regime of islands'. Paragraph 2 gives islands the same zones as other land territory, while paragraph 3 denies rocks that cannot sustain habitation or economic life an EEZ or continental shelf. States disagree on how it applies to specific islands.
  • Equity principle: the rule that delimitation must achieve an equitable result in light of coastal geography and proportionality.
  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
  • TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983, recognized by Türkiye.

Related guides: Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus and the Two-State Vision, Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration, and our About page on the site's mission and transparency.

Soft Power Daily Editorial Team. Soft Power Daily presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article as a clearly labeled national position, alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is the Seville Map in the Eastern Mediterranean?

It is a 2020 map based on a University of Seville study and circulated in an EU context. It assigns full continental shelf and EEZ zones to Greek islands, including Kastellorizo (Meis), and leaves Türkiye a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya. It is a study-based proposal, not a treaty, court ruling or binding EU act.

Is the Seville Map an official EU position?

No. It is not a legislative or legal act of an EU institution, and the EU has no competence to delimit maritime boundaries between states. The EU Council has expressed political solidarity with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, but that is not a boundary determination.

Why does Türkiye reject the Seville Map?

Ankara argues that delimitation must follow the equity principle, that case law often limits the effect of small islands lying close to a long mainland coast, that the EU cannot decide delimitation, and that the map ignores the equal rights of Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has made these points in its statements on Eastern Mediterranean maritime issues.

What does Greece say about islands and maritime zones?

Greece argues that under UNCLOS Article 121 and customary law, inhabited islands have the same maritime zones as other land territory. It says the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, and it has proposed taking that dispute to the ICJ.

Is Türkiye bound by UNCLOS?

Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. It states that it has consistently objected to the application of the Convention's island regime to its detriment and that customary international law, with the equity principle, governs delimitation. Greece and the EU hold that key UNCLOS provisions reflect customary law binding on all states.

How has Türkiye registered its maritime position internationally?

Türkiye has submitted Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates to the UN since 2004 and filed its outer limits on 18 March 2020. It also presented its Marine Spatial Planning on 16 April 2025 and registered it with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Soft Power Daily presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article as a clearly labeled national position, alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

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